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This paper analyses the effectiveness of the corporate income tax as an automatic stabilizer. It 
employs a unique firm-level dataset of German manufacturers combining financial statements 
with firm-specific information about credit market restrictions. The results show that 
approximately 20 per cent of all firms report both positive taxable income and capital market 
restrictions. Taking account of the income tax rates and the size differences of the firms, we 
find that demand stabilization through the corporate income tax amounts to about 8 per cent 
of an initial shock to gross revenues. This stabilization effect varies over the business cycle 
and tends to increase during cyclical downturns. 
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September 2009 1 Introduction
The current economic crisis has given rise to a debate on the role of scal policy as a factor
stabilizing demand and, ultimately, employment and output. There are essentially two ways in
which scal policy can contribute to demand stabilization: rstly, governments may cut taxes
or increase expenditure; secondly, governments may rely on automatic stabilizers. Auerbach
and Feenberg (2000) dene automatic stabilizers as 'those elements of scal policy that tend
to mitigate output uctuations without any explicit government action' (ibid., p.37).
How do automatic stabilizers work? To make things simple, consider an economy with a
proportional income tax with a rate of 30 per cent. The eectiveness of the income tax as an
automatic stabilizer depends on two factors. The rst factor is how a given shock on gross
income aects after tax income. In our example, a decline in income by 100 Euros leads
to a decline in net income by 70 Euros. This implies that the income tax has absorbed 30
per cent of the initial shock to gross income. The second factor is the link between current
disposable income and demand. In the case of private households, current expenditure on
consumption goods usually diverges from current disposable income as households try to
smooth consumption over time. But if households have no nancial wealth and cannot borrow,
their current expenditures will largely be determined by their disposable income. In the case
of rms, decisions on current expenditures for investment goods and other inputs will be
determined by capital costs and expectations about the protability of investment, rather
than current cash ow, which depends on the results of past investment. But rms may also
lack nancial reserves and face borrowing constraints. As a result, a cushioning of shocks to
current cash ow may stabilize their demand, too.
This paper analyses the eectiveness of the corporate income tax as an automatic stabilizer.
Usually, the debate about automatic stabilizers focuses on the personal income tax. This
is because the income tax is more important in terms of the tax revenue it generates and
because it is progressive. We focus on the corporate income tax for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the base of the corporate income tax is smaller than that of the personal income
tax, but its volatility over the business cycle is much higher. Its potential contribution to
1overall automatic stabilization may therefore be more signicant than its share in tax revenue
suggests. Secondly, the automatic stabilization properties of the corporate tax raise some
policy issues, in particular the role of intertemporal loss oset, which are less pressing in
the context of the personal income tax. Thirdly, the role of the corporate income tax for
automatic stabilization has been largely neglected in the literature.
With few exceptions, the literature on automatic stabilizers focuses either on the personal
income tax, social insurance contributions and benets (see e.g. Auerbach and Feenberg
(2000), Auerbach (2009), Mabbett and Schelkle (2007), Dolls et al. (2009)), or on the tax
system as an aggregate (Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (2002), Bayoumi and Masson (1995)), so
that the specic issue of corporate taxation plays no role. The role of the corporate income tax
as an automatic stabilizer is discussed in Devereux and Fuest (2009).1 They suggest a simple
method to measure the automatic stabilization eect of the corporate income tax, building
on the concept of normalized tax change introduced by Pechman (1973). The normalized tax
change relates the cushioning eect of the tax system to the size of the initial shock to gross
income. In the simple example used above, the normalized tax change is equal to 30 per cent.
Essentially, Devereux and Fuest (2009) start from the fact that the corporate income tax is
largely proportional in most countries, so that the normalized tax change would be equal to
the tax rate. But if taxable income falls below zero, any cushioning of shocks to gross income
disappears unless losses can be carried back to earlier periods. In most corporate tax systems,
this is either impossible or highly restricted. Firms may be able to use loss carryforwards in
future periods, but this does not stabilize current cash ow. Given this, a stabilizing eect
of the corporate income tax can only emerge in rms which have two characteristics: they
must be credit constrained and their current taxable income must be positive. Applying this
approach to data for UK rms, Devereux and Fuest (2009) nd that the corporate tax is
largely ineective as an automatic stabilizer. On average, the demand stabilization through
the corporate income tax in the UK is equal to only 1 per cent of the initial shock to gross
income. In the presence of full loss oset, the stabilization eect would have been equal to
8.5 per cent.
1Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) also discuss the role of the corporate tax as an automatic stabilizer but do
not produce any estimates. Their focus is on the U.S. federal income tax.
2The present paper extends the literature as follows. It is an important limitation of the
analysis in Devereux and Fuest (2009) that rm specic information on credit constraints and
prot or loss positions comes from two separate and unconnected data sources. The share of
rms with both credit constraints and positive taxable income is, therefore, approximated by
assuming that all rms with losses also face credit constraints. As a consequence, stabilization
eects could only emerge if the number of credit constrained rms exceeds that of loss making
rms. This approach underestimates the stabilization eects of the corporate tax as soon as
there are rms which run tax losses but do not face credit constraints. In addition, size
dierences across rms cannot be taken into account. Our analysis is based on a new dataset
of German manufacturing rms which combines rm specic information on capital market
restrictions with nancial information about the rms. This allows us to provide a much more
detailed picture of the prevalence of tax losses and nancing constraints among rms. Thus,
we are able to provide more precise estimates on the eectiveness of the corporate tax to act
as an automatic stabilizer.
Our analysis leads to the following results. Most importantly, we nd that, in the period from
2003-2007, where detailed data is available, biannually, approximately 20 per cent of all rms
report both positive taxable income and credit constraints. Given the German corporate
income tax rate of approximately 38 per cent, and taking account of the size dierences of the
rms, we nd that demand stabilization through the corporate income tax amounts to about
8 per cent of the initial shock to gross revenues.Yet a binary regression analysis reveals that
the rms reporting credit constraints and positive prots dier from other rms. Besides size
dierences, we nd that rms with a bad business situation are overrepresented among these
rms. This casts doubt on the view that these rms would indeed use all available funds for
additional investment. Therefore, the estimate of 8 per cent is probably an upper bound for
the average stabilization eect.
Another important result of our analysis is that the stabilization eect changes systematically
over the business cycle. Since the share of rms with positive taxable income is procyclical
whereas the share of rms with credit constraints is anticyclical, it is unclear, a priori, whether
the stabilization eect is pro- or anticyclical. In our dataset, it turns out that the change
in credit constraints over the cycle dominates: Our sample starts in 2003, when Germany
3was in the middle of a severe economic downturn. For April 2003, our stabilization measure
is equal to approximately 13 per cent. In the following periods, Germany experienced an
upswing, and the stabilization measure declines continuously to reach a value below 3 per
cent in August 2007.
The rest of the paper is set up as follows. In section 2, we discuss the key factors which
determine the automatic stabilization eect of the corporate income tax and we derive the
measure of automatic stabilization we use for the empirical analysis. Section 3 includes the
empirical analysis. Section 4 summarizes the results and concludes.
2 Firms and Automatic Stabilization Eects of the Corporate
Income Tax
Consider a rm without capital market restrictions. Ignoring risk, this rm would invest in
the capital stock if the expected return on capital investment exceeds that of an alternative
investment say government bonds. Under standard assumptions, this decision is not aected
by the return on past investment. Hence, a shock to the rm's revenues would not aect the
investment of the rm. A rm, however, that is facing capital market restrictions, is likely to
respond to a revenue shock. As this rm would use internal funds to nance its investment,
partly or fully, a shock to current revenues translates into changes in the investment decision.
For this rm, a cushioning of revenue shocks due to the corporate income tax is important
and will help to smooth investment spending.
If the rm that experiences an adverse revenue shock still makes prots, it benets from a
decline of tax payments in a proportion corresponding to the statutory tax rate. However,
if the rm makes losses, the degree to which revenue shocks to rms are cushioned through
corporate income taxation depends on the treatment of losses (Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000,
Devereux and Fuest, 2009). In an ideal case, where all losses can be carried back to some
previous periods with positive prots, cushioning of revenues is symmetric. A rm facing a
loss would benet from a reimbursement of previous tax payments in the same proportion as
4a rm with positive prots. However, in the more realistic case, where loss carry backs are
restricted, the corporate income tax does not exert much, perhaps no cushioning of revenue
shocks to a rm that incurs tax losses. This suggests that the existence of positive taxable
prots constitutes a second qualication to a stabilizing role of the corporation tax.
How can the cushioning eect of the tax system be measured? In this paper, we use a simple
measure of the cushioning eect, building on Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) and Devereux
and Fuest (2009). Consider an economy with n rms. The cash ow of rm i in period t is
given by
CFit = Rit   C
f
t   Tt(Rit;Dit;:) (1)
where Rit denotes the rms revenue net of marginal costs in period t, C
f
t denotes xed costs,
Dit denotes deductions from the tax base related to xed costs like e.g. interest on debt or
depreciation of capital goods, and Tt(:) is the rms current corporate income tax payment.
Note that the rm's income tax payment may depend on a number of variables, including
taxable prots of past periods. Assume that there is a shock on Rit , denoted by dRit. The
eect on the rms cash ow is given by




Equation (2) shows that the impact of an exogenous revenue shock dRti on the rm's cash
ow is mitigated by the tax system if current tax payments change as a result of the decline in
revenue and, hence, taxable prots. Of course, current tax payments of rms not only depend
on current revenues but usually also depend on past taxable prots and other predictors of
current prots, depending on the rules for tax prepayments. However, as a rst approxima-
tion, the analysis below assumes that
@Tt(Rit;Dit;:)
@Rit is equal to the statutory corporate income
tax rate, denoted by t, if taxable prots are positive and equal to zero for loss making rms.
The stabilizing eect of the corporate income tax system on the cash ow of all rms in the
economy in period t (ACF
t ) can be dened as the dierence between the cash ow eect which
would occur in the absence of taxes and the cash ow eect in the presence of taxes, divided









As pointed out above, the stabilization of cash ows does not necessarily lead to a stabilization
of investment demand. This can only be expected from liquidity constrained rms. Among
these rms, only rms with positive taxable prots will be aected by automatic stabilizers.
Denote the number of rms with both credit constraints and positive prots in period t with
mt < nt, and order rms such that these rms have lower index values j. The aggregate eect









If the shocks which hit protable credit constrained rms and other rms are, on average, of

















In the following, we will use data for German rms to measure the stabilizing eect of the
corporate income tax for the case of Germany.
3 Empirical Application
What arises from the considerations in the preceding section is that the potentially stabilizing
role of the corporation tax varies with the share of rms that are subject to capital market
restrictions and, at the same time, protable in the sense that their taxable income is positive.
Now, this share is likely to change over the business cycle. Actually, it proves anticyclical.
This can be seen from Figures 1 and 2 which plot the Ifo Credit Constraint Indicator for
6Figure 1: Credit Constraint Indicator vs. Business Climate
the German economy2 against the ifo Business Climate Indicator or the degree of capacity
utilization (taken from the ifo Business Survey).
To provide empirical evidence we take resort to a unique dataset for German rms that
combines rm-specic information about business situation, capacity utilization, and capital
market restrictions with nancial information about these rms { including prot and loss
statements. The data are supplied by the Economics and Business Data Center (EBDC)
in Munich.3 For the purpose of the current analysis we focus on ten waves of the data
where information about capital market restrictions is provided, starting with June 2003
until August 2007.
2Until 2007 twice a year, the Ifo Business Survey asks rms about their assessments of bank lending policies.
The rms are asked to respond to the following question: \How would you assess the current willingness of
banks to extend credit to business"? The Credit Constraint Indicator is calculated from the percentage of the
responses in the category \restrictive" (alternative categories are \accommodating" and \normal").
3A data description is available at: http://www.cesifo-group.de/link/_EBDC_database
7Figure 2: Credit Constraint Indicator vs. Capacity Utilization
8Figure 3: Credit Constraint Indicator vs. Share of Restricted Firms in EBDC Database
Since the EBDC data used in the study is a subset of the ifo Business Survey where nancial
information from the Amadeus database has been merged we might be worried about whether
this subsample is representative of the ifo Business Survey used in Figures 1 and 2. Figure
3 plots the ifo Credit Constraint Indicator for the manufacturing industry against the share
of the rms in our data that consider bank lending policies as restrictive.4 The gure shows
that the EBDC data on credit constraints provides a reasonably good approximation of the
general trend in the ifo Business Survey.5
Empirical evidence on the importance of losses is provided by Figure 4. It includes not
only the share of rms reporting capital market restrictions but also the share of rms that
4Following the practice of the ifo Credit Constraint Indicator a rm is considered credit constrained in our
analysis if the appraisal of bank lending policies is \restrictive" rather than \accommodating" and \normal".
5While rather new, the ifo Business Survey's information on credit constraints is widely used to assess
capital market restrictions in Germany (e.g., Bundesbank, 2008). A recent micro-level study exploiting the
ifo Business Survey's question on credit constraints (vonKalckreuth, 2008) nds a signicant association with
rm-level investment policies similar to results based on the Industrial Trends Survey by the Confederation of
British Industry (vonKalckreuth, 2006).
9Figure 4: Share of Restricted Firms vs. Share of Firms with Losses
10Figure 5: Share of Restricted Firms with Positive Prots
experience losses. The share of rms reporting capital market restrictions is generally twice
as large as the share of rms with tax losses (note that the share of rms with losses is
reported on the vertical axis at the right-hand side). Remarkably, this relationship proves
rather robust across the dierent time periods.
The descriptive statistics presented so far suggest that the stabilizing eect is subject to
dierent cyclical eects. On the one hand, the share of rms where (net-) revenues are
exerting an impact on investment due to capital market restrictions is anticyclical. On the
other hand, the share of rms where net-revenues could potentially be smoothed by the
corporate income tax due to positive taxable prots is procyclical. Thus, the question arises
whether, due to the lack of loss oset, the stabilizing eect of the corporation tax is rather
weak in downturns when it would be most important. However, whether this is the case
depends on the cyclicality of the joint distribution of losses and credit constraints.
11Evidence is provided by Figure 5 which shows the share of rms that are reporting capital
market restrictions but still report positive prots (in the above notation, the gure depicts
mt
nt ). This group of rms will not only adjust their investment expenditures to the availability
of internal funds. They are also in the position to benet from a stabilization of revenues due
to the corporation tax. As it turns out, this group of rms on average makes up a fth of all
rms (axis is on the left hand side), indicating that the stabilizing role of the corporation tax
is much smaller than indicated by the share of restricted rms.
To sum up, with regard to the role of taxes as automatic stabilizers, our results suggest that
over the ten waves of the ifo Business Survey that provide information about capital market
restrictions the corporate income tax acted as a stabilizer of investment in a fth of the
German rms, on average. This share, however, is higher in the beginning of the time period,
when the economy suered from a low degree of capacity utilization and when the business
conditions were rather weak. Later, when the business situation improved, the share is much
lower. A closer inspection of the cyclical pattern reveals two countervailing eects: the share
of rms that face capital market restrictions, which, therefore, tend to adjust investment
spending to net revenues, is increasing in cyclical downturns. At the same time, the higher
likelihood of losses during downturns tends to oset a possibly stabilizing role of the tax
system. Yet the net eect points at a stronger role of the corporate income tax as a stabilizer
during downturns.
The role of the corporate income tax needs to be further qualied, however, since it seems
likely that the rms where a smoothing of investment might take place are rms that are
small or are struggling from bad business perspectives. In the former case, demand eects
might be unimportant, in the latter case, rms might have reason to cut down on investment
spending, anyway.
Figure 6 depicts results for a simple binary regression testing whether specic rm character-
istics have signicant eects on the probability to jointly report capital market restrictions
and positive prots. Figure 7 provides descriptive statistics. While the dummies for the waves
depict the time pattern noticed above, the size-range (szrg) and the age of the rm show sig-
nicant inverse eects. This is in accordance with standard results in the literature on credit
12Figure 6: Characteristics of Restricted Firms with Positive Prots
Figure 7: Descriptive Statistics
13Figure 8: Weighted Share of Restricted Firms with Positive Prots
rationing. Also publicly quoted rms depict an inverse eect. However, tangibility does not
prove signicant. The appraisal of the current business situation by the rm (statebus) shows
a positive eect. Note that this categorial variable varies between 1 (good) and 3 (bad).
Hence, the positive eect shows that rms with a bad business situation are overrepresented
among the group of restricted rms with positive prots. However, the rm's size shows a
much stronger eect. This suggests that in an assessment of the role of the corporation tax
as an automatic stabilizer we should take resort to statistics weighted by rm size in order
to assess the importance of rms that are restricted in terms of credit but report positive
prots. Figure 8 documents that the share of these rms weighted by employment (using the
size variable szrg) is somewhat lower indeed.
Based on individual rm data, Figure 9 reports an aggregate measure of stabilization corre-
sponding to Equation 6. This measure is obtained as a weighted sum of the statutory tax
rates for all rms where a positive prot as well as credit constraints are reported and zero
14Figure 9: Measure of Stabilization
for all other rms.6 As can be seen from the gure, the average measure of stabilization is
about 7.8%. For comparison, in the hypothetical case with complete loss-oset opportunities
where all restricted rms benet from a stabilization of net-revenues, the average measure
would be higher: according to our estimates the mean gure would be about 11.5 %.
The gure also shows that the stabilizing eect of corporate income taxation changes system-
atically over the business cycle. In June 2003, when Germany was in a downturn the stabi-
lization measure is equal to approximately 13 per cent. In the following periods, Germany
experienced an upswing, and the stabilization measure declines continuously and reaches a
value below 3 per cent for August 2007.
6Note that we compute the rm specic tax rates taking account not only of the corporation tax and the
solidarity surcharge but also of the local business tax rate faced by each rm.
154 Conclusions
Using ten waves of a survey of German manufacturing rms, we nd that, on average, about
20 per cent of all rms reported both positive taxable income and the existence of credit
constraints. Accordingly, at tax rates of approximately 38 per cent, and taking account of the
size dierences of the rms, demand stabilization through the corporate income tax would
amount to about 8 per cent of the initial shock to gross revenues.
While the data used in the above analysis oers a unique combination of rm specic infor-
mation about credit market restrictions and nancial statements, the empirical magnitudes
presented are subject to uncertainties. The micro-level evidence rests on nancial statement
and survey data that captures the conditions faced by the rm only by approximation. The
nancial statements might dier from the tax accounts and also do not provide information
about the existence of tax shields such as loss carry-forwards. Also the survey data on credit
constraints should be considered with caution, since the distinction of the dierent response
categories might be somewhat fuzzy. Besides measurement issues, the evidence about the
level of stabilization needs to be qualied in a number of ways. First, this estimate is proba-
bly providing an upper bound of the stabilizing eect since loss making rms and rms facing
credit constraints may constitute a non-representative group of rms. Indeed, our analysis
reveals that the rms reporting credit constraints and positive prots are smaller than the
average. We, therefore, weight the data with rm-size in order to calculate the above aggre-
gate measure of the stabilization eect. We also nd that rms with a bad business situation
are overrepresented among these rms. Hence, the willingness of these rms to invest might
be low.
Our results also suggest that the stabilizing eect of corporate income taxation changes sys-
tematically over the business cycle. While stabilization eects are mainly expected to occur for
rms with positive taxable incomes that are also facing credit constraints, our data suggests
that the likelihood to report positive taxable income is procyclical whereas the likelihood
of credit constraints is anticyclical. In our dataset, it turns out that the change in credit
constraints over the cycle dominates such that the eectiveness of the corporate tax as an
16automatic stabilizer tends to increase during cyclical downturns. Of course, the time period
considered is rather short, so it would be interesting to reconsider the evidence in future
research.
Can we expect our results, which have been derived with German data, to apply to other
countries as well? Most European countries have lower statutory corporate tax rates, so that
the potential for stabilization eects is lower. But it might be the case that other countries,
in particular countries with lower GDP per capita and less developed capital markets, exhibit
a larger share of credit constrained rms. This would suggest a stronger eect on demand
stabilization.
What are the policy implications of the analysis in this paper? One immediate implication
is that our analysis highlights a cost of crowding back loss oset provisions, in particular
loss carryback possibilities: restricting loss oset reduces the automatic stabilization eects
of the tax system. Of course, extending loss oset would come at a cost in terms of revenue
raised, and the question is whether the benets in terms of automatic stabilization properties
of the tax system justify this. The benets of automatic stabilization through the corporate
tax system depend on a number of factors. One issue is whether demand stabilization, if
it works, also stabilizes domestic output. If rms import investment goods or intermediate
inputs, part of the demand stabilization achieved by automatic stabilizers will leak to other
countries. The existence of multinational rms may be another reason why the benets of
automatic stabilization may be limited. These rms may well use the cash ow generated in
one country to nance investment in another country. These are interesting issues for future
research.
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